The same implementation structure that has
failed rural development over decades cannot be deployed for the
radically new programme promised by NREGA.
Barely two years on, there is a clamour for scrapping the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). The chorus is led by no less
than the Chief Minister of one of India’s most populous and backward
States. We live in a strange country. We have fanatics who want to put
up barricades to debar “outsiders” from entering our metros. Others
suggest that speaking for the farmer is “the idiocy of urban thinking”
(Sagarika Ghose, H industan Times, February 15, 2008). They repeat ad
nauseam what Indian planners have been trying for the last 50 years —
unabated urbanisation and industrialisation as the panacea. Agriculture
can continue to be the “bargain sector,” especially now that the Indian
economy grows fast even when agriculture stagnates.
Such a view is completely blind to the deepening distress in rural
India. A policy tried for 50 long years has not worked. Even during the
reforms era, over the last 15 years, India has had an unacceptably high
proportion of malnourished women and children that refuses to come
down. Thousands of farmers have committed suicide, a phenomenon
unprecedented in the history of Indian civilisation. Surely, it is time
for a change, time to recognise the centrality of agriculture, which
the World Bank too has recently woken up to. This is not to deny the
role of industrialisation and vibrant metros. But to emphasise the deep
complementarities between industry and agriculture, town and country.
These are not just the narrow input-output ratios of economists; they
are also bonds social, cultural and ecological that hold a nation
together.
Our cities are bursting at the seams, crumbling under the pressure of
providing even basic amenities to their inhabitants. But the answer
cannot be xenophobic hysteria. While improving urban habitats, we need
to better conditions in villages so that there is less distress
migration in search of work to urban India. Having lived for nearly two
decades in a tribal area steadfastly moving forward on a path of
sustainable rural development (rejuvenated watersheds, thriving
“rainbow” agriculture, empowered women, vibrant markets, clean air,
cell phones, internet connectivity and good roads), I can even foresee
a time when there is a reverse migration to villages, in search of a
better life, more wholly understood.
The contribution of agriculture to national income has fallen
dramatically in recent years but more than 600 million of our people
still depend on farming. This is not a small number that can be just
wished away. In fact, the growing divergence between the share of
agriculture in GDP and in the workforce, alerts us to the urgent
imperative of raising farm productivity in India, which languishes way
below potential. On a sound agrarian base, we can build a whole range
of other location-specific, nature-based rural livelihoods.
Herein lies the potential of NREGA. It ranks among the most powerful
initiatives ever undertaken for transformation of livelihoods in rural
India. The unprecedented commitment of financial resources by the
largest employment programme in human history is matched only by its
imaginative architecture. The emphasis on planning of works and
mechanisms of social audit means that quality of works is centrally
important. This is not a welfare programme dishing out doles. It is a
development initiative, chipping in with crucial public investments for
creation of durable assets, which can provide the much-needed momentum
to growth in the most backward regions of India. The thrust is on
construction of earthen dams, bunds and ponds as part of a watershed
development strategy. On this foundation of water security, can be
built a sustainable village development plan that includes a
rejuvenated agriculture and allied rural livelihoods.
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of NREGA, making a decisive break
with the past, is the complete ban on contractors. Ever since
independence, most government programmes in rural areas have been
implemented through the agency of local contractors, who have emerged
as major agents of exploitation of the rural poor, especially women.
They have run roughshod over basic human rights, paid workers a
pittance and used labour-displacing machinery. NREGA bans the use of
such machines, mandates payment of statutory minimum wages and provides
various legal entitlements to workers. It visualises the involvement of
local people at every stage — planning, implementation and social
audit. All of this is obviously incompatible with programmes where the
main goal becomes maximisation of profits of the contractor.
New chapter
The radical provisions of NREGA signal the possible inauguration of a
new chapter in rural governance. But a radically new programme also
makes dramatically new demands from the system. A bureaucracy that has
its hands full with a whole host of pre-existing responsibilities can
hardly muster the imagination and energy required by NREGA. In the
main, rural development in India has not been seen as requiring
full-time professional inputs. The abiding notion is of
welfare-oriented, routine administrative work. Over the last 20 years,
politicians so committed to an agenda of reforms for the corporates,
appear to have absolutely nothing to offer to their main constituency,
the rural poor. On the contrary, with pressure on the state to shrink,
expansion of programmes (whether health, education or NREGA) is
increasingly attempted with under-staffed establishments, using
under-paid, poorly qualified “worker-volunteers.” Corners must be cut
when it comes to the rural poor. Anything for them, it appears, can be
of the lowest quality.
The 73rd Amendment raised hopes that the issue would be addressed by
taking democracy to the grass roots, with the empowerment of Panchayati
Raj Institutions (PRIs). One of the reasons this has not worked is the
meagre funds devolved to PRIs. They have not been provided with an
adequate support system either. Post-NREGA, all over the country there
is palpable excitement among PRIs (the main implementing agency) which
have never before seen this volume of funds being transferred to them.
The problem is that the support structure needed by PRIs to properly
utilise these funds is still missing.
In a study recently published in the Economic and Political Weekly
(February 23, 2008), my colleagues Pramathesh Ambasta, P.S. Vijay
Shankar and I have worked out a detailed blueprint of the reforms
needed to make NREGA a success. This blueprint can form the core of a
meaningful response by the government following the weaknesses recently
identified by the Comptroller and Auditor General. We have carefully
catalogued all the tasks involved in effective NREGA implementation. We
find that both the number and quality of human resource deployed so far
are completely inadequate. Governments have failed to recognise the
enormous diversity of skills required to execute the work with speed
and quality. There is need for a large number of full-time
professionals, many of whom could be recruited from the open market,
while strictly enforcing their accountability to PRIs. We call for a
nationwide movement of capacity building so that a massive cadre of
fully trained “barefoot professionals” is developed at the gram
panchayat level. Much greater use of information technology would be
critical for transparency, accountability and speed at all stages, from
sanction of works, release of funds and wage payments to social audit.
Outmoded Schedules of Rates need to be revised, to bring them in line
with a new programme that bans machines and contractors.
The government should also mandate a role for civil society
organisations (CSOs) to work as support agencies for PRIs in NREGA
planning, implementation and social audit. This would help
institutionalise the CSO-PRI partnership, putting pressure on both CSOs
and PRIs to learn to work together. Strictly speaking, these reforms
should have been in place well before NREGA was launched. But it is
obviously better late than never.
The expenditure entailed in these reforms must be regarded as
“investments” and not administrative overheads or contingencies, as
currently understood. Without these inputs, NREGA appears almost
programmed to fail. On the other hand, a very small investment in the
support structure could make a big difference in transforming NREGA
outlays into enduring outcomes. Our detailed calculations show that
professional support costs come to no more than 6 per cent of the total
cost of NREGA works, while the capacity building effort would take just
2 per cent. In addition, 1 per cent needs to be set aside for
monitoring and evaluation. We show that pure administrative expenses
can actually be kept as low as 1 per cent of cost of works.
Reformed on these lines, the NREGA has the potential to not only
transform livelihoods but also herald a revolution in rural governance.
Of course, neither a professional system nor a vigilant public is by
itself sufficient to guarantee an accountable democracy that actualises
development for the poor. Both need to grow organically in tandem with
each other.
http://www.hindu.com/2008/03/14/stories/2008031455581000.htm
Copyright
© 2008, The Hindu.
