For all but the most
fanatical, Bangladesh writer Taslima Nasreen’s announcement that she
would remove from her book Dwikhandita the portions critical of Islam
that were regarded as objectionable should bring to a close the
controversy that sparked violent protests in Kolkata and earlier in
Hyderabad. Her decision itself was a pragmatic concession to the
intolerant who would seem to be beyond reason. It was preceded by some
deft handling of the situation by Union External Affairs Minister
Pranab Mukherjee. His statement on the issue made in Parliament was
categorical that Ms Nasreen would be unconditionally permitted to live
in India and provided security. This was followed by pronouncements in
the nature of advice that guests in India were expected to refrain from
political activities and from making statements that would hurt the
sentiments of the people. It was heartening to note the widespread
support Ms Nasreen obtained when Islamic extremists represented by the
All India Minority Forum in Kolkata and the MIM in Hyderabad launched
their attacks on her. Not to be missed, however, was the hypocrisy of
some Hindu extremist forces who rushed to her defence. These very
forces were at the forefront of the campaign against the renowned
artist M.F. Husain for his depiction of Hindu deities, a campaign that
included vicious street demonstrations and dozens of court cases and
virtually forced him to flee the country. Similar protests followed
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi’s disputing the existence of
an ancient bridge between India and Sri Lanka across the Palk Straits
as described in the Ramayana, and earlier Deepa Mehta’s film Fire. It
needs to be emphasised that freedom of expression is indivisible and if
it applies to Ms Nasreen’s critical references to Islamic figures and
doctrine, it should apply equally to criticism of other religions,
including Hinduism, Christianity, and Sikhism.
It is to ward off the charge of double standards that religious
establishments the world over, who should be placing their faith in the
strength of their doctrines rather than in the sanctions of the
criminal law, are united in their demand for legal protection and
immunity for all religions from criticism. Yet in most democracies
there is an increasing realisation that legal mechanisms are
inappropriate for dealing with matters of faith. Nowhere is this more
marked than in the United States where the Supreme Court has declared
unequivocally: “It is not the business of government in our nation to
suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious
doctrine…” In the United Kingdom, the blasphemy law that affords
protection only to the doctrine of the Church of England is rarely
invoked and there have been only two prosecutions since 1922, the last
in 1977. It needs to be noted that criticism, however strong, does not
curtail the religious rights of others — for in a democratic and
pluralist society what any religious group can demand is respect for
its right to practise its religion, not respect for its doctrine to the
extent of curtailing the freedom of expression of others. On the other
hand, in the interest of maintaining harmony and public order, the
state ought to curb hate speech that targets a religious group and
incites discrimination and violence against it.
It is ironic that in India hate mongers who foment disaffection and
violence among religious communities go unpunished, while a writer, an
artist, or a film-maker making critical references to a religion, at
times even unwittingly, is often harassed through criminal cases. The
Indian Penal Code contains extensive provisions that penalise offences
against religion and religious groups. Some — such as the one barring
the promotion of “disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will”
between religious groups [Section 153A (1)] and the one that deals with
disrupting worship and ceremonies in a place of worship [Section 153A
(2)] — are intended to safeguard public order and protect the religious
rights of others. On the other hand, Section 295A, which is perhaps the
most extensive blasphemy law applicable to all religions, provides for
three years’ imprisonment to anyone who, with the “deliberate and
malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings” of any class
of citizens, “insults or attempts to insult the religion or the
religious beliefs of that class.”
It is this omnibus section that has turned into an instrument of
harassment of writers, artists, and film-makers. In justification, it
is argued that given the intense, and often violent, reaction that any
attack on religious beliefs provokes, it is necessary to bar speech
that offends religious sentiments. However, as the European Court of
Human Rights pointed out, freedom of expression extends not merely to
ideas that are received favourably or are inoffensive but also to those
that “offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the
population” — a position that has been endorsed by the Supreme Court of
India. As for the hostile audience problem, the Supreme Court declared
categorically in the case of the film Ore Oru Gramathile (S. Rangarajan
v P. Jagjivan Ram) that if speech cannot be constitutionally restricted
on any of the grounds specified in Article 19(2), “freedom of
expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration
and processions or threats of violence.” Since what is insulting or
offensive is judged on a religion’s own terms, orthodox and
fundamentalist groups within every religion are allowed to arrogate to
themselves the right to set the parameters of public discourse. The
increasing use of Section 295A in the recent period has underlined the
dangers of competitive intolerance curtailing the space available for
freedom of expression. The section is clearly not in consonance with
democratic and constitutional values and it is time it was removed from
the statute book.
http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/05/stories/2007120553641000.htm
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© 2007, The Hindu.
